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ABSTRACT
This paper describes and illustrates a methodology to conduct postflood investigations based on in-
terdisciplinary collaboration between social and physical scientists. The method, designed to explore the link
between crisis behavioral response and hydrometeorological dynamics, aims at understanding the spatial and
temporal capacities and constraints on human behaviors in fast-evolving hydrometeorological conditions. It
builds on methods coming from both geosciences and transportations studies to complement existing post-
flood field investigation methodology used by hydrometeorologists. The authors propose an interview
framework, structured around a chronological guideline to allow people who experienced the flood firsthand
to tell the stories of the circumstances in which their activities were affected during the flash flood.
This paper applies the data collection method to the case of the 15 June 2010 flash flood event that killed 26
people in the Draguignan area (Var, France). As a first step, based on the collected narratives, an abductive
approach allowed the identification of the possible factors influencing individual responses to flash floods. As
a second step, behavioral responses were classified into categories of activities based on the respondents’ nar-
ratives. Then, aspatial and temporal analysis of the sequences made of the categories of action to contextualize
the set of coping responses with respect to local hydrometeorological conditions is proposed. During this event,
the respondents mostly follow the pace of change in their local environmental conditions as the flash flood
occurs, official flood anticipation being rather limited and based on a large-scale weather watch. Therefore,
contextual factors appear as strongly influencing the individual’s ability to copewith the event in such a situation.
1. Introduction
Western Mediterranean regions are favored locations
for heavy precipitating events. In recent years, many of
them resulted in destructive floods with extended dam-
age and loss of life, including flash floods in France in
Nı^mes in 1988, Vaison-la-Romaine in 1992, the Aude in
1999, and the Gard in 2002 and 2005 (Delrieu et al. 2005;
Gaume et al. 2004). On 15–16 June 2010, the vicinity of
the town of Draguignan (Fig. 1), located in the Var
department,1 was hit by a violent storm. The daily accu-
mulated rainfall reached 200 and 300mm over, respec-
tively, 2000 and 250 km2 and led to significant flash
flooding (Rouzeau et al. 2010). According to the latter
Corresponding author address: Isabelle Ruin, LTHE, Ba^timent
OSUG-B, Domaine Universitaire, B.P. 53, 38041Grenoble CEDEX
09, France.
E-mail: isabelle.ruin@ujf-grenoble.fr
1Administrative division of France between the region and the
commune, equivalent to 3 to 4 times the median land area of a U.S.
county.
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authors, this event is one of the 20 most important flash
flood events reported since the 1950s in the western part
of the French Mediterranean coast. Since the last de-
structive flood occurred in Draguignan in 1827, there
was no contemporary memory of that event.
The rainfall event of 15 June 2010 was particularly
intense (Fig. 2). The maximum rain amount recorded at
the M!et!eo-France station of ‘‘Les Arcs-sur-Argens’’
reached 400mm in 24h (including 330mm in less than
10h) (Fig. 3). These values largely exceed a return period
of 100 years (Martin 2010). Two periods of the 2010 event
can be seen. During the first period, the atmospheric flux
came from south-southwest and led to intense precip-
itation, but it quickly swept nearly the entire Var depart-
ment [up to 1600 local time (LT)].2 During the second
period, the flow was oriented southeast and precipitation
stayed quasi stationary over the Nartuby watershed
upstream of Draguignan (184 km2) (after 1600 LT).
The predictability of such phenomena remains low in
terms of rainfall intensity and location. In this case
study, the rivers responsible for the inundation were not
part of the operational river monitoring system man-
aged by the regional flood warning service [Service de
Pr!evision des Crues M!editerran!ee Est (SPC-ME)]. This
is partly because flood forecasting of such quick
response catchments remains a scientific challenge.
Therefore, only the M!et!eo France vigilance map was
available to warn the inhabitants of the department for
heavy rainfall and potential flooding. Based on the
rainfall forecast, M!et!eo France broadcasted the heavy
rainfall watch (M!et!eo-France orange vigilance, third
level of warning over a maximum of four) on Monday
14 June at 2300. The 24-h forecast predicted daily rain
amount from 80 to 150mm for the day of the storm (with
a max of about 250mm). The orange vigilance warning
launched the daybefore concerned 11French departments
(i.e., 60 000 km2) and then 6 departments (32 000 km2)
on the morning of the storm day. The warning level that
is issuedwhen the daily forecasted precipitation is greater
than 200mm was never reached so the red vigilance was
not issued.
This event was responsible for the death of 26 people
and damages were evaluated at 1 billion euros. A number
of 2450 persons were rescued, including 1350 who were
airlifted and 300 who escaped very perilous situations
(Rouzeau et al. 2010). Three municipalities experienced
most of the fatal accidents: Draguignan (10), Trans-en-
Provence (Trans) (5), and Roquebrune (5). As often in
case of flash flooding, the circumstances of the accidents
are nearly evenly distributed into two categories: on the
one hand, casualties happening inside buildings (13 ca-
ses over 26) and mostly affecting elderly (average age5
68; median age 5 79), and on the other hand, casualties
occurring on the road when walking or driving (13 out of
26) and affecting younger people (average age 5 52;
median age 5 56), especially males (nine men and four
women) (Vinet et al. 2012). The way age and circum-
stances were distributed has already been observed for the
2002 flash flood event in the Gard region in France (Ruin
et al. 2008). This paper also indicates a possible link be-
tween the accidents’ circumstances, the age of the victims,
and the flood dynamics related to the scale of the upstream
drainage area.
Even with such a heavy death toll, the consequences
could have been even more dramatic considering the vi-
olence of the floods, the lack of flood alerts, and the sig-
nificant damage in the vicinity of Draguignan. Actually,
the timing of the flood corresponds to rush hour formost of
the municipalities. In the small surrounding village of
Figani"eres, for instance, the residents felt lucky that the
peak flow in themain street happened 15min after schools
dismissed their students for the day.
This flash flood event offers a typical example to study
the relation between the flood dynamics and the dy-
namic of the social response. Flash floods differ from
slow rise riverine floods. With flash floods, the time of
peak flows in the different rivers across the storm area
may vary greatly according to the structure and motion
FIG. 1. Location of the city of Draguignan within the Mediter-
ranean area and together with other major historic flash flood
events. Annotated from Nuissier et al. (2008).
2We choose to express dates in local time (UT1 2 h) instead of
UTC time to be consistent with the rest of the paper in which dates
refer to social activities.
Fig(s). 1 live 4/C
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of the convective storm (more than propagation in
rivers). This asynchronicity of peak flows seems to be
a significant source of danger (Creutin et al. 2013). It
forces crisis managers and/or individuals to adapt to the
rapid evolution of local conditions in a way different from
standard emergency response to riverine floods. In the
case of the storm of 15 June 2010 (that we call the Dra-
guignan case hereafter) the rapidity of the river rise and
the lack of anticipation of the authorities compelledmany
individuals and communities to organize themselves to
cope locally with the event. The flood happened so quickly
that some communities did not have time to even access
rescue services. Nevertheless, individuals and impro-
vised groups managed to inform, organize, and protect
themselves on their own, without any official involve-
ment (Parker and Handmer 1998; Creutin et al. 2009).
Investigating human and environmental circumstances
of personal stories experienced by individuals and
groups in such a crisis is key to learning more about the
link between environmental conditions and social set-
tings. To better learn from those positive cases and
to consider the influence of environmental conditions
versus social settings, we need to investigate the various
circumstances of such successful adaptation. Why and
when did people change their behaviors when facedwith
the quickly changing environmental conditions?
This paper describes and illustrates a new methodol-
ogy to conduct postevent field investigations based on
interdisciplinary collaboration between social and
physical scientists. Past experience shows that postflood
investigation methodologies have been developed for
diverse purposes. For example, local and national au-
thorities conduct such legal/administrative investigations
to officially answer public concerns about the cause and
FIG. 2. Total precipitation amount from 0600 UTC 15 Jun 2010 to 0600 UTC 16 Jun 2010. (From M!et!eo-France
http://pluiesextremes.meteo.fr August 2011 edition.)
Fig(s). 2 live 4/C
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impacts of floods (Lefrou et al. 2000; Huet et al. 2003;
Hornus and Martin 2005; Rouzeau et al. 2010). Opera-
tional services, like the U.S. Geological Survey or the
National Weather Service, conduct ‘‘service assess-
ments.’’ Research institutions also investigate extreme
events after they occur (Gaume et al. 2004; Delrieu et al.
2005; Gaume and Borga 2008; Martin 2010; Payrastre
et al. 2012). However, postflood collaborations between
social and physical scientists remain rare. The few ex-
amples of multidisciplinary work, when examined
closely, are not integrated collaborative projects but
patchwork quilts of a variety of specialists who study
separate aspects of an event. In this flood study arena,
true integration of information, data, and knowledge
from different fields is lacking, with the result that nei-
ther the physical nor the social science perspectives gain
a comprehensive picture of the extreme event. This
paper attempts to demonstrate that integration of
physical and social concerns under the form of common
research questions and methodology is possible and
useful.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2
explains the interdisciplinary research questions, pur-
pose, and theoretical background. Section 3 investigates
the possible causes of individual responses based on the
analysis of the narratives. Section 4 shows the pre-
liminary results of the analysis based on a space–time
framework pertinent to compare the dynamics of both
the natural phenomena and the social response. Finally,
the conclusions and implications for future research are
reported in section 5.
2. Purpose and theoretical background
a. Contextual factors: A key question to understand
individual responses
Postevent investigations of the 2007 floods in England
(Pitt 2008), Xynthia (Leonard 2010), and flash flooding
in the Var region (Rouzeau et al. 2010) in France high-
lighted serious breakdowns in the warning response sys-
tem.Nevertheless, the literature on the factors influencing
individual and societal responses to such early warnings
remains weak (Mileti 1995; Drabek 1986, 2000; Sorensen
2000; Parker et al. 2009). Lindell and Perry (1992, 2004)
developed a Protective Action Decision Model (PADM)
of residents’ responses to hurricane warnings as a com-
posite of new information and environmental cues com-
bined with preexisting beliefs based on past experience.
Their model of agent response helpfully incorporates the
temporal dimension in terms of individual experience,
forecast lead time, and the time required for evacuation
and other protective action. Nevertheless, it is aspatial
and ignores contextual factors such as neighborhood ef-
fects on individual responsiveness (Parker and Handmer
1998) as well as the potential for emergent effects. How-
ever, other works have highlighted the importance of
these contextual factors, such as the timing of an event
(i.e., middle of the night vs midday) within the rhythms
of everyday life (Ruin 2010), as key influences on in-
dividual and institutional responses to warnings. These
individual and institutional responses are defined as
multiscalar and nonlinear and involve what has been
called ‘‘socially distributed cognition’’ (Dash and Gladwin
FIG. 3. Hyetograph at the M!et!eo-France station of Les Arcs-sur-Argens.
Fig(s). 3 live 4/C
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2007) in which, as the FLOODsite project concluded,
‘‘context is everything in understanding flood warning
response’’ (Parker et al. 2009, p. 104).
Thus, based on several studies performed in Europe
concerning social responses to flooding, Parker et al.
define two categories of contextual factors influencing
the responses to flood warning: physical characteristics
and social circumstances (Parker et al. 2009). Among
physical characteristics, the severity of the flood and the
time available between thewarning and the flood appear
as the most important factors on social responses.
Concerning social characteristics, people’s experience,
their knowledge concerning flood risk, and the distri-
bution of responsibility for responding to flooding are
identified as the main influencing factors for floods.
Because of the suddenness in the rise of water levels
and the spatial dispersion of the possible impacts, timely
flash floods warning (official warning) is limited and
insufficient (Borga et al. 2011). Flash floods often sur-
prise people in the midst of their daily activity and force
them to react in a very limited amount of time. In such
fast evolving events, impacts depend not just on such
compositional variables as the magnitude of the flood
event and the vulnerability of those affected, but also on
such contextual factors as its location and timing. De-
pending on contingent conditions (e.g., at night when it
is difficult to see, rush hours when there are errands to
run and children to pick up and lots of other cars on the
road, or working hours when people feel they must be at
work regardless of the conditions), perception of envi-
ronmental cues needed for self-warningmay be hindered.
Likewise, the nature and dynamics of the individuals’
reactions will differ according to the location and activity
they were performing when they felt the need for action
aswell as their capability to connectwith their relatives or
to have social interactions allowing a group response
(Gruntfest 1977; Mileti 1995; Drabek 2000; Lindell and
Perry 2004). Those specific contextual factors can alter
the scale and social distribution of impacts and vulner-
ability to them. In the case of flooding fatalities, for in-
stance, the elderly are often said to be the most vulnerable
(Parker et al. 2009), but when fatalities aremapped against
basin size and response time, it has been shown that in fact
it is young adults who are most likely to be killed in flash
flooding of small catchments, whereas the elderly are the
most frequent victim of large-scale fluvial flooding (Ruin
et al. 2008).
Further investigations in the Gard region in France,
where social response to flash flood was examined in de-
tail, have shown that such a tendency could be explained
by a difference of attitude across ages with respect to
mobility related to daily life routine and constraints
(Ruin 2010). Even if this appears as a tendency in both
the analysis of limited data on death circumstances and
intended behavior surveys, behavioral verification is
very much needed.
Collecting data on actual behavioral responses or
practices in the context of hardly predictable extreme
weather events is a challenging problem. Participant ob-
servations are not possible for evident reasons. Indirect
observations using sensors or videos pose questions of
the quantity and spatial distribution of the observation
devices, the quality and completeness of the data they
provide, and their robustness in extreme conditions.
Even for hydrological purposes, such devices are often
overwhelmed and/or unreliable in flash flooding condi-
tions (Gaume and Borga 2008). The observation and
understanding of individual behaviors requires more
qualitative methods, already broadly used when study-
ing the interactions between society and the environ-
ment in the context of global change (Walters and
Vayda 2009; Goldman et al. 2011). The understanding of
decision-making processes in flooding situations is im-
proving through empirical studies using ad hoc survey
methods. Although many efforts lead this way, a holistic
comprehension of the main contributing factors is still
challenging because of the heterogeneity of themethods
used (Parker et al. 2009). This paper contributes to
this effort, proposing an ‘‘event-based methodology’’
(Walters 2012) to collect data in the context of postflood
investigations.
One of the main goals is to understand why people
decide to travel in hazardous weather conditions and
how they adapt (or do not adapt) their activities and
schedule in response to environmental perturbations.
This requires an integrated approach, sensitive to the
spatial and temporal dynamics of geophysical hazards
and responses to them (Drobot and Parker 2007; Morss
et al. 2011). The Coupled Human and Natural Systems
(CHANS) approach offers an interesting theoretical
background for the analysis of interactions between
environment and society (Liu et al. 2007). In particular, the
spatiotemporal framework proposed by Holling (2001)
constitutes an interesting tool for integrating both physical
and social factors involved in the individual response to
flash flood. Its multiple scales perspective allows taking
into account the variability of these factors depending
on both the dynamic of the hydrometeorological event
and the dynamic of the social response (Ruin et al. 2008;
Creutin et al. 2009, 2013).
In the case of flash floods, the time available to ‘‘an-
ticipate’’ the danger varies dramatically in space and
according to the size of the drainage area upstream of
the point of interest. In general, as catchment size de-
creases, the delay between rainfall and flood peak de-
creases. More importantly, the shorter this delay is the
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faster the water level rises in the river. In addition, the
absolute time of danger outburst varies in space accord-
ing to storm characteristics, and the appropriateness of
individual and group response across space scales is
hard to assess (Creutin et al. 2009, 2013). For instance,
the timeliness of a reaction may be perfect at a point
within a large basin, while the same reaction performed
at the same time at a neighboring point prone to a small,
faster-reacting catchment may be inappropriate and
late.
To evaluate the timeliness of the individual’s reactions
with respect to the surrounding hydrometeorological
dynamic, we need to capture both routine and complex
rescheduling processes and to understand how much of
this is related to the hazardous hydrometeorological
conditions. The observation of activity rescheduling de-
cision processes has been developed recently in trans-
portation studies (Doherty and Miller 2000; Roorda
et al. 2005; Clark andDoherty 2010). These studies often
combine various survey methods as questionnaires, di-
aries, and in-depth interviews together with GPS
tracking in order to ‘‘capture both routine and complex
scheduling processes as well as observe those scheduling
decisions made during the actual execution of the
schedule’’ (Doherty and Miller 2000). The proposed
methodology for the postflood investigation is derived
from such a method.
b. Postevent field investigations: Method and practice
The proposed methodology is designed to collect
the pieces of evidence needed for both understanding
the hydrological context and behavioral responses. The
following subsection describes the survey tools and
methods that were designed to collect such datasets.
The field campaign distinguishes two phases. In the
first phase of the field campaign, termed ‘‘REXhydro,’’
the witnesses were asked about the timing and dynamics
of the event. The main objective of this team was to
determine the peak discharge estimations based on hy-
draulic considerations (Gaume et al. 2004; Gaume and
Borga 2008) and to evaluate the related flood dynamics
on a range of spatial scales by questioning witnesses
close to the studied river sections. This phase also allows
for identifying a first list of persons susceptible to be
interviewed (in the second phase of the study) about
their behaviors during the flood.
This second phase, going by the name of ‘‘REXsocio,’’
aims at collecting individuals’ own stories through
semistructured interviews. It especially focuses on col-
lecting timing and spatial information related to the
evolution of the environmental conditions and the in-
dividuals’ location and pace of activities. Its objective is
to document how individuals switch from routine
activities to emergency coping behaviors. Inspired by
the activity-based approach, it is structured around
a chronological guideline with which we invited in-
terviewees to recall what they perceived from their
environment, what actions they took, and who they
interacted with at the various places they stayed while
moving in between places (Fig. 4). The interviewees
were asked to tell their story from 15 June at noon. To
help localize and collect more accurate information,
we offered them the opportunity to locate the various
places and draw their itineraries on street plans and/
or road maps.
During the June 2010 storm event, the flood hit all the
downstream part of the Argens watershed (2700 km2).
As our objectives were to test the influence of flooding
dynamics on human behaviors and also to understand
how anticipation time and adaptation strategies would
still happen even in fast-reacting catchments, we decided
to focus on strongly impacted locations within relatively
small catchments where the rivers’ responses range from
less than a half hour to a few hours. We concentrated our
data collection efforts on three close-by municipalities:
Figani"eres (2572 inhabitants), Trans-en-Provence (5513
inhabitants), and Draguignan (37 649 inhabitants).
Catchments’ sizes in the different locations surveyed
ranged from 4 to 196 km2 (Fig. 5).
The interviews were conducted using a ‘‘snowball’’
(nonprobability) sampling strategy in order to capture
the effect of social networks in triggering emergency
reactions. By crossing the individual stories, we were
able to confirm the timing and spatial characteristics of
both the social and hydrometeorological event. Fur-
thermore, the snowball method enables the recon-
struction of the social network and personal interactions
emerging during the event.
The survey campaign started with interviewing
the contact persons listed by the REXhydro team.
While these people were telling us their stories, we
asked them to identify any other people with whom
they were in contact (directly or indirectly) at various
stages of the event. Then, as much as possible, we
interviewed all the contacts they mentioned to get
a more precise idea of the specific situations in which
they were all involved.
The data collected vary in nature. The first information
includes narratives related to the type of places, activities,
social interactions, and environmental circumstances
contextualizing each individual’s reaction. The second
type of data consists of the location and time data nec-
essary to relate each performed activity within the very
specific environmental circumstances in which they took
place. A total of 38 interviews were collected. Among
them, 29 were complete and reliable enough to be used
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for the analysis. Based on where respondents were when
they took action, 16 interviewees were concerned with
the flooding of small catchments (less than 20km2) and 11
persons with larger ones (approximately 200km2) (Fig. 6).
Two other respondents interviewed in Trans and
Draguignan are part of the analysis but could not be rep-
resented in Fig. 6 as their reaction could not be attrib-
uted to a specific catchment in the study area.
3. The possible causes of the individual’s response
timing
This section examines a few individual’s stories that
illustrate key lessons learned from a comparative anal-
ysis. The stories reveal some common points concerning
the way people coped with the timing of the event. In an
abductive process (Walters 2012), our purpose is to define
the possible causes of these responses based on the ob-
served actions performed during the event (the effects).
a. A general sense of lack of anticipation
Comparing the timing and geographic distribution of
the protective actions, together with the flood stage’s
testimonies collected through the REXhydro (as shown
by Fig. 7), shows that very few respondents actually
anticipated the threat of the flood. Asmentioned earlier,
even if most of the protective actions started before
the estimated time of the peak flows (considered here as
the peak of danger), people did not really anticipate the
flooding stages that would inundate the buildings.
For exemple, the story of one of our respondents
working at the Var region firefighter coordination office
(service d!epartemental d’incendie et de secours, SDIS)
in the upper catchment of the Riaille in Draguignan is
particularly illuminating. Until 1630 (LT), even knowing
the orange vigilance level was on, the SDIS was only
dealing with communication issues to report the crisis
due to the flooding of the prison in a neighboring area of
the city. The potential flooding of the SDIS building was
not foreseen and therefore firefighters were not pre-
pared to secure their rescue teams and equipment. At
1630 the water was entering the street and then the
courtyard of the SDIS 5min later. The level of the
water was up to the tires at 1730 and was still rising.
Around that time, people started to move the cars to
the SDIS courtyard for protection and then to climb
upstairs as they were trapped in the SDIS building.
At 1830 telephone service was disrupted and no more
FIG. 4. Semistructured interview framework used for the REXsocio to collect 29 testimonies in three municipalities
affected by the June 2010 floods in the Var area.
Fig(s). 4 live 4/C
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communication was possible with the outside. The water
reached the windows of the cars at 1840, then the cars’
roofs at 1950. At that time, our respondent escaped the
building swimming with the purpose of helping the im-
periled people in the neighborhood. His dangerous res-
cue tasks lasted until 2200 after he failed collecting his
wife (case 13) who was waiting in an improvised shelter
in a close-by neighborhood. Eventually, he managed to
get back to his home that was out of the flooded area to
recover.
Several other examples show, like this one, the diffi-
culty for people to take timely protective actions. Even
if some of them did receive official warnings (the orange
vigilance in this case) relatively early, it did not trigger
immediate reactions; many looked for confirmation of
the information through other sources and oftentimes
by looking or waiting for environmental cues to become
obvious. Similarly, if some people started to organize
themselves or protect their goods quite early compared
to the local flooding dynamic, they somehow hardly
managed to adapt the pace of their protective reaction
to the pace of the river response and ended up pro-
tecting their own life at the last minute. As was already
shown in previous works (Parker et al. 2009), the offi-
cial warning is not sufficient information for acting
properly, even in the emergency services. The ability to
anticipate the possible event is crucial but dramatically
reduced in flash flood cases, and the timing of the event
appears as a key factor.
b. The difficulty of making sense of the situation
Because flash flooding environmental conditions vary
tremendously across space in very short amounts of
time, it is often difficult for victims to comprehend the
situation in which they are embedded or to imagine the
variability of the threat when moving across space.
Several stories collected during the interviews empha-
size this issue.
FIG. 5. Distribution of the number of interviews collected (in parenthesis) in each catchment (white lines) and
outlets (white dots). The black isolines display the total rainfall accumulation over the event. The small yellow
squares show the location of flood stage timings collected through the first round of the postevent investigations. The
location of the fatal accidents during the event is also displayed with black crosses.
Fig(s). 5 live 4/C
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FIG. 6. Details of the type of activity performed by selected interviewees over time. Rainfall intensity and M!et!eo-France vigilance levels illustrate the evolution of environmental
circumstances over the study area. In addition, flood stages observations issued from the REXhydro investigations are displayed for each catchment.
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The story of respondent 19 is a good example of
people who learned about the catastrophic flash flooding
affecting their neighbors or relatives through TV news
the next day. As an 86-yr-old man living alone in his
house, he did not learn about the flood before the next
morning when he went to buy his bread in downtown
Figani"eres and discovered the damage in the main
street. Fortunately, his house, located on the hill, did not
get threatened. As already shown in a previous study,
this kind of reaction seems to mostly concern the elderly
who are often more socially isolated or marginalized
(Ruin and Lutoff 2004).
Cases 13 and 36, related to each other, highlight other
kinds of difficulties related to making sense of the situ-
ation. On the one hand, they tell us the story of a woman
(case 13) who by attempting to help her mother flooded
at home got caught on the road in a very dangerous sit-
uation. Knowing her parents’ home location is prone to
flooding, she called her mother around 1600 and learned
there was already 2 cm of water inside the house. Then
she called her father, who was involved as a firefighter in
the flood rescue. He advised her to go and help her
mother if it was still possible to access the residence. Then
she left her work place in downtown Draguignan at 1620
and drove toward her parents’ home located 2km away.
Encountering water on the way, her car stalled about
500m before her parents’ house. At first she felt safer in
her stranded car until the vehicle started to float. Un-
fortunately, she was stuck inside with too much pressure
on the doors to open them and no power to open the
electric windows. After being trapped in the car for
25min, she finally managed to restart the engine, open
the electric windows and escape, fighting against the
current, with the help of a man who happened to be
around. On the other hand, her mother (case 36) was
accustomed to having her house flooded. She anticipated
and reacted appropriately to the event by following her
own safety procedure (we will come back on this later),
FIG. 7. Space–time distribution of the hydrological and behavioral data for 15 Jun 2010. Dots show where protective actions took place,
and the color code displays the starting time of each individual’s action. Colored squares show the time of the runoff peak flow estimated
from hydrological postevent investigations. Related peak flow simulations fromPayrastre et al. (2012) for the Nartuby and Tuili"ereRivers
are displayed, and the timing of protective actions in those catchments are reported on the hydrograms with colored lines.
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starting as soon as 1500 (which is very early). Neverthe-
less, she was thinking that only her house got flooded (as
usual) and therefore she did not understand why her
daughter, on the way to help her, would not arrive. She
only learned about her daughter’s situation at 0300 when
her brother living in Marseille called her to give her the
news that her daughter was safe.
These latter examples show the strong but equivocal
influence of experience on preparedness and the in-
dividual’s ability to make sense of the situation and for
‘‘self-warning’’ (Parker et al. 2009).
Several cases demonstrate the importance of being
able to capture environmental cues in this self-warning
process. For instance, reacting to the Nartuby River
flood in Trans-en-Provence, respondent 4 started to
actively protect her goods and themerchandise from her
shop together with her husband around 1800. Her re-
action was triggered by the accumulation of cues within
the preceding hour. First, she was alerted by shoppers
who reported road flooding and 1m of water near Trans
town hall. Then the power went off. Finally alerted, she
walked toward the river to see for herself what was going
on. Floodingwas ongoing and as she said, ‘‘The old bridge
over the river was trembling with people standing on it.’’
Back in her shop, she found the water was starting to
enter. Then, together with her husband, she saved im-
portant documents and climbed upstairs to their flat
(located above the store).
The environmental cues may become decisive be-
cause they have significance through the specific history
or experience of the witness. Here again, the experience
of analog situations appears as a key factor. The story of
respondent 20 gives us a better insight about that pro-
cess. In the case of this shopkeeper of the main street of
Figani"eres, her decision to evacuate upstairswas prompted
by hearing the creak of her entrance door that was being
pressured by the flooding water. When she heard the
noise, it reminded her of the sound of a wildfire that she
experienced before. So she got frightened about her own
situation and of the ones of her employee and the
shopkeeper next door and hurried everyone to go to
safety together.
However, sometimes the experience may play an
equivocal role in the sense-making process. Respondent
14, a shopkeeper of the Draguignan-Commercial Area
(CA), was informed of the first runoff problems in her
shop by a phone call from her employee as early as 1330.
At that time, she did not quit her routine and finished
attending her meeting. At 1530, because of traffic, it
took her an hour to drive back to her shop to see by
herself what was happening. When entering the store, as
she was used to having her shop invaded by rainwater
coming from the surrounding parking lots and poor
drainage, she first started to deal with the supposed
obstruction of the sewer system. She finally decided to
move her car to higher ground. When she went out by
the riverside she realized the danger was coming from
the river and not from the parking lot. She managed to
park her car on high ground and called her employees
who had stayed in the store and told them to evacuate
immediately.
Making sense of the situation appears to be a key el-
ement of the decision-making process in flash flood sit-
uations. The testimonies collected during the 2010 flash
flood in the Var emphasize the essential but equivocal
role of previous experiences in this process.
c. Emerging self-organization and the emergence of
a collective response
Fortunately, the general lack of anticipation or the
difficulty of making sense of the situation is often
compensated by self-organization and the emergence
of helpful social interactions.
A first example of self-organization comes with the
story of respondent 36 (already evoked). Because her
home had already been frequently flooded (and maybe
because she is married to a firefighter), she was well
prepared for flooding and had made her own ‘‘flooding
checklist.’’ She started, as early as 15:00, to follow the
various steps by (i) checking the level of the water that
was still 40 cm below the level of the house, (ii) re-
questing that the parents of the three children she takes
care of come to pick them up, (iii) driving the three cars
to higher ground, and (iv) securing her important papers
and eventually calling her husband to ask himwhat to do
when the water entered the house at 1715. On his advice,
she evacuated her single-story house together with the
last 2-yr-old child whose mother was not able to pick up
the child fast enough. They went to the first floor of her
mother’s house next door.
As for the emergence of a collective response, it is
interesting to look at three testimonies (cases 30, 31, and
32) recollecting a story that happened inDraguignan-CA.
It shows how much ‘‘unofficial’’ warnings or improvised
emergency action may be influential in lessening the
impact of flash flood events. The action started with
respondent 31 who interpreted the environmental cues
of refrigerators floating in the river as a serious indicator
of danger and initiated the process of protecting himself
at 1650. On his way to evacuating he went to the shop
nearby (respondent 32) as he knew one of the employees
working there. When he saw the people trying to keep
the water (which was already about 30 cm deep) from
entering the store, he realized they were not under-
standing the situation correctly and argued for them to
evacuate with him. Nearly simultaneously, respondent
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30, passing by on his way to evacuate warned them too,
saying ‘‘if you don’t leave you will die.’’ Finally around
1745, respondent 32 and the other employees agreed to
take protection following respondent 31 to the upstairs
of a neighbor’s warehouse.
Beyond the simple interactions between people, this
story illustrates the emergence of collective response
that takes place when individuals need to improvise
a reaction to face unexpected circumstances together
with people who are in the same location at that time.
Emergent groups may be composed of people who al-
ready knew each other before the flood, as it was partly
the case in the previous story. This is more likely to
happen in places where people have their habits like
home or work places. But collective response also hap-
pens among people who have never interacted before
(see case 13 described in section 3b) and may never in-
teract again after. As seen in case 13, this might happen
when people are traveling, especially when moving
outside of their usual area of practice.
d. Conflicting priorities and the beneficial influence of
a third party
Sometimes, even when the threat becomes obvious, en-
vironmental cues are not even acknowledged nor consid-
ered sufficient by those at risk to overcome their daily life’s
priorities. This was the case for many of our respondents.
The story of respondent 32 in Draguignan-CA also
shows that the man was still in a ‘‘routine’’ mode, while
other respondents around had already started to take
protective measures (Fig. 6). At that time, this business
owner and director was in his store busy dealing with the
installation of newly arrived merchandise. He only agreed
to evacuate 30min later after being warned by several
people and after the water had largely inundated the shop.
Another example demonstrating both the difficulty of
making sense of the situation and prioritizing work’s re-
sponsibility, two employees (only one was interviewed)
of a store ended up being in a dangerous situation by
spending toomuch time trying to savemerchandise. Both
womenwere working when the water started flooding the
shop. At first they thought it was only runoff because of
the slope of the parking lot. Their reaction was to protect
the merchandise by raising it up out of the flood water’s
reach. They only felt the need to run awaywhen thewater
reached their hips about an hour later and after their
employer, who they talked with on the phone, advised
them to leave. By the time they escaped on foot, cars
were already floating around. Luckily, they finally
managed to reach a hotel uphill that ended up serving as
an improvised shelter for the area.
A similar and even more striking case happened in
Figani"eres and shows how much the presence of
a detached party can fortunately influence the decision-
making process. The story involved a young pregnant
business owner (respondent 25) accompanied by a
friend (and client whomwe did not get to interview) and
a municipal employee who came to help (respondent
27). The two women were trapped in the respondent’s
shop located downstairs from the main street. The flood
water running along the street was about 0.5m deep
(above the street level), which meant nearly 1.5m above
the floor of the shop.3 The only way to escape the shop
was to open the window where the municipal employee
was standing and try to convince the women to leave.
From the interview, we understood that the business
owner did not want to open the window because she was
not thinking of her own security but, rather, she was
afraid that her newly started business would be dam-
aged. It was thanks to her friend who had no emotional
nor financial involvement with the business that they
finally opened the window, broke through the wall of
water (thanks to the help of the man outside), and were
able to survive unharmed.
4. The pace of individual responses
a. The individual responses dataset
Based on this first analysis and inspired by activity-
based analyses in mobility and transportation studies,
the narratives were coded to reflect the various types
of situations reported. The variable called ‘‘place’’ was
coded to show the type of social places where people
were located such as the workplace, a dwelling, or a
public building. From all the answers received we dis-
tinguished eight categories (Fig. 8). We hypothesized
that the type of place where people are situated might
influence individual responses to warnings, as it has been
argued in previous research that coming back home and
gathering the family there is one of the first drivers of
behaviors during a crisis (Drabek 1986; Mileti 1995).
The variable called ‘‘activity’’ codes the type of behaviors.
Four main categories were selected with the objective of
capturing the transition from routine activities that are
qualified as ‘‘usual’’ and crisis activities including three
gradual states that qualified in previous work as ‘‘in-
formation’’, ‘‘organization,’’ and ‘‘protection’’ (Creutin
et al. 2009). Three more categories were added: 1) ‘‘re-
covery’’ was attributed to postemergency action, 2) ‘‘in
danger’’ was used to indicate that the individual’s situ-
ation was life threatening,4 and 3) ‘‘travel’’ was used to
3The shop is located in the basement of the building.
4According to the interpretation of the researcher based on the
description the victim made of the situation.
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emphasize periods when respondents were moving be-
tween stations or were in transit, as those might be fac-
tors of enhanced exposition to flash flooding and a lesser
perception of danger (Ruin et al. 2007, 2008). Under
the categories of information, protection, and travel,
subcategories were created to precisely identify the
various goals of such activities. The list of the cate-
gories and subcategories employed for the coding are
listed in Fig. 8.
The data file issued from the coding of the interviews is
structured around three distinct sets of variables. The first
one gathers sociodemographic data about the re-
spondent: gender, age, and profession. The second one
gathers six variables describing the stations or fixed lo-
cations where the respondent spent time and the related
action(s). These variables include latitude and longitude,
starting time and ending time, and place code and activity
code. A block of station data is entered each time a new
location, place, or activity has been reported and can be
easily delimited in time. This means that if the person
stayed at home the entire time but declared, for instance,
that he or she switched his/her activity from daily routine
to an organizational stage at a certain time, a new block
of data is entered with the same geolocation and place
code but with a different activity code reflecting its
switch to an organizational activity during this specific
period. The third set of two variables codes is for the
travel modes (four modalities) and purposes (seven
modalities) (Fig. 8) occurring in between the stations or
locations. Therefore, one person might have a pattern of
a data block describing a series of stations and travels.
b. Dynamics of the hydrometeorological event as
a reference
To compare the type and pace of individual responses,
we used the reference of the flood timing, common for
a specific location. The flood phases have been identified
thanks to the data collected through the REXhydro
(Payrastre et al. 2012). A comprehensive review of mete-
orological and hydrological datasets was conducted before
proceeding to field measurements. Information about
high water marks and the floods’ timing were collected
in the field a few days after the event by theCentre d’!Etudes
Techniques de l’!Equipement (CETE) M!editerran!ee
(CETE 2011).
The estimation of maximum peak discharges based on
measurements of river sections, high water marks, and
estimation of flow velocity reported by witnesses are the
result of the REXhydro field investigations (Payrastre
et al. 2012) according to the method developed by
Gaume and Borga (2008) and Borga et al. (2008). The
hydrograms in Fig. 7 are issued from distributed rainfall–
runoff simulations (Cinecar model) using different curve
numbers (CN) of the Soil Conservation Service (SCS)
model with the value in the range of 35 (retention ca-
pacity of the soils up to 472mm) to 100 (constant runoff
FIG. 8. List of the color and numeric codes used to process the qualitative data collected
through 29 semistructured interviews conducted in the Var area on November 2010.
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coefficient equal to 100%) (Gaume and Bouvier 2004;
Gaume et al. 2004).
According to radar data on 15 June 2010 rainfall was
light over the areas of interest from the end of the night
until 1030 in the morning, causing a rain amount of 5mm.
Then the intensity increased significantly between 1030
and 1230, causing an additional amount of 15mm. Starting
from 1230 on 15 June 2010 and up to 2000, steady rainfall
intensities around 30mmh21 were observed with several
peaks of more than 50mmh21. The total precipitation at
2000 was respectively 175, 220, and 205mm over the
Figani"eres, Draguignan, and Trans watersheds. The
rainfall intensities remained around 8mmh21 a few
hours after 2000 and weakened during the night. The
rain finally stopped at 0600 on 16 June. Ultimately, 258,
306, and 311mm were respectively estimated in Fig-
ani"eres, Draguignan, and Trans.
According to the hydrological postevent investi-
gations, the dynamics of the floods in each location were
quite different. The flooding of the small catchment of
the Tuili"ere River at the outlet of Figani"eres village
(4 km2) started around 1700 and lasted about 30min
(Fig. 7), with fast moving water overtopping the main
street of the village by 1.60m. A few kilometers farther
down the village, at the outlet of Figani"eres–Saint Esprit
(19 km2), the flood seemed to have started slightly later
and the inundation was reported to have lasted until
0700 the next morning. The flooding of the Riaille
seemed to have started a little later (30min to 1 h) than
the flooding of the main river, which began at 1530 on
15 June. The Riaille peak flow happened around 1700
and 1800, while the Nartuby was at its maximum be-
tween 1630 and 1815. In Draguignan, 10 people died
from the flood, and at least one casualty was clearly at-
tributed to the Riaille. Most testimonies about the flood
stage indicate the flooding began Tuesday 15 June after
1500 and finished on Wednesday morning 16 June. In
this village, the Nartuby River rose to its maximum
around 1800 and stayed at its peak (or had a second
peak) until 2300 (Fig. 7). The speed of the flow of the
Nartuby entering a gorge in Trans-en-Provence killed
five people, destroyed a few buildings close to the river,
and triggered a landfall affecting the cemetery.
c. Coping response versus hydrometeorology
To allow a comparison of the coping response and the
flooding dynamics in each catchment, Fig. 7 displays the
chronology of each respondent’s activity according to
the location where they started to take protective actions.
At the time protective activities started 16 respon-
dents had to cope with fast-reacting catchments: 14 in
Figani"eres related to the flooding of the Tuili"ere River
basin and 2 in downtown Draguignan because of the
Riaille River. In Figani"eres, 10 respondents started to
react within the same timeframe of about 1 h (1615–1730)
(Fig. 7). Compared to the flood stages reports from the
CETE, most of the protective actions started after 1630,
anticipating the time of the peak flow by at least 15min.
Two respondents reacted either simultaneously or late
and three respondents (17, 18, and 19) did not need to
take protection measures because they were out of the
flooded area. The only two testimonies we have in
downtownDraguignan show a very different timing with
a first, early reaction at 1500 and a second 5 h later.
The 11 respondents located near the Nartuby River
were concerned by the flooding of larger catchments. In
the larger catchment of Trans-en-Provence (196 km2),
the six behavioral responses are spread over 2.5 h with
most people responding before 1630. In Draguignan-
CA, drained by the Nartuby 184 km2 basin, the five
protective actions happened in a time window of 2 h but
most of them started after 1630. According to the flood
stage reports and peak flow simulation, flood responses
seemed to have been a little more anticipated in Trans
than in Draguignan-CA. When the interviewees initi-
ated coping responses, 16 of the respondents were at
work, 9 were outside buildings (including 5 traveling
either by car, by bus, or walking), and 2 were at home.
To give an overview of the coping response and its
environmental circumstances, Fig. 9 displays the pro-
portion of interviewees by type of activity over time
together with the rainfall intensity over the Trans wa-
tershed. According to the figure, the event is divided
into four periods that correspond to the evolution of the
hydrometeorological context.
The first phase is before 1400 with a first important
precipitation sequence cumulating about 60mm but
without any serious runoff or river reaction. The or-
ange vigilance level launched by M!et!eo France the day
before seems to have slightly increased awareness but it
had negligible effects on people’s preparation. In fact
on 15 June at noon nearly all the respondents (91%)
were immersed in routine activities. From 1215 to 1345,
the number of people in routine mode decreased to the
profit of the information mode peaking between 1330
and 1345, with 24% of the respondents. The in-
formation activity increased until 1335 and matches the
first peak in rainfall intensities (which occurred around
1245). During that period, only six people expressed
some kind of awareness related to the hydrometeoro-
logical event. Four of them explicitly said they became
aware of the M!et!eo France storm watch (orange vigi-
lance level) for the Var area when they were watching
the midday news on TV at home during their lunch
break. According to what they said, this information
did not affect their plans for the day or their level of
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concern. One of them did recommend that visiting rela-
tives should bring boots and raincoats. One person (31),
who had a direct upper viewon theNartubyRiver fromhis
working place, felt concerned by the environmental cues.
Respondent 14 was warned by a phone call from one of
her employees reporting the first runoff problems in her
shop that was situated a few meters from the Nartuby
River in Draguignan-CA.
Phase two, between 1400 and 1630, corresponds to the
flood precipitation-generating sequence that added
90mm to the first phase. During that period, intense
surface runoffs were already taking place in some areas.
The number of people switching to protective action
only starts to increase at 1500, shortly following
a second and major rise in rainfall intensities and just
before the occurrence of the first peak flow at 1530 in
the lower part of the Nartuby catchment. In total, only
three people reported that they switched to an orga-
nization mode and seven others to a protection mode.
As shown by the pink dashed curve representing the
cumulated percentage, the number of imperiled re-
spondents starts to rise slowly at 1545 as one person
(12) found herself in a dangerous situation in the
commercial area of Draguignan, not far from the
confluence of the Riaille and the Nartuby Rivers.
Comparing the timing and geographic distribution of the
protective actions together with the flood stage’s testimo-
nies collected through theREXhydro, Fig. 7 shows that for
some respondents protective actions were mostly syn-
chronized with the beginning of the water rise. This was
the case for respondents 12, 13, 29, 30, 34, and 36 in the
Draguignan area and 26 in Figani"eres. Based on those
testimonies, most protective actions only started when
some water entered the work place or dwelling where
people were located. One exception was 13 whose first
protective action was to drive to her mother’s place to
help her dealing with the flooding. All the other re-
spondents’ reactions were to elevate merchandise above
the flood level and/or tomove their car to higher ground.
This is the only type (code 42 on Fig. 6) of protective
actions that took place during that phase. Our re-
spondents dedicated quite some time (from 30min to
2 h) to this activity that often ended up with them being
in dangerous situations, either during this same phase
(12) or during phase three (29 and 30). In Figani"eres, even
if a few people started to feel concern about the environ-
mental cues, only one person (26) reached an organization
stage during this period by first trying to figure out the first
runoff problems in front of her shop and then raising the
goods in her shop as the water entered.
FIG. 9. Time evolution of the percentage of respondents by type of activity and corresponding areal rainfall intensity
and time of peak flows over the study area (196km2). Time step is 15min.
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Phase three, from 1630 to 1815, corresponds to the
flood danger outburst constituting a powerful ‘‘pace
maker.’’ This phase cumulated 40mm more rainfall to
the previous rainfall for a total amount of 70 to 200mm
from the east to the western part of the area. It triggered
major peak flows in all of the studied rivers. This period
follows a drop of the routine, information, and organi-
zation curves to the profit of the protection curves that
reaches an inflection point around 1645, when the
switching rate is at its highest. In total, during that period
18 respondents were forced to take protective actions
against the inundation, including 3 only switching to
an organizational stage. Most of them were either in
Figani"eres (12) or in Draguignan (4). Because of the
time of the day most people were at work when they had
to take protection and most of the dangerous travels
during that phase were related to the purpose of pro-
tecting oneself or rescuing someone. In Figani"eres, of-
ficials started to become aware of the abnormality of the
situation around 1630 when they started to get several
phone calls from inhabitants reporting runoff problems
in the main street of the village. The first rescue opera-
tions (using municipality resources only) started shortly
after. It involved few local officials and employees
walking toward the locations of the reported problems
to figure out what to do. They ended up rescuing people
out of dangerous situations as the example of respon-
dent 27 helping 25 to escape the flooding of her shop (as
described in the previous section). In Figani"eres village,
the flood was extremely localized, mainly affecting the
main street. The flooding was so fast5 that even if some
people tried to secure their goods at first they rapidly
realized that they had to take shelter by going upstairs
when that was possible. In the commercial area of
Draguignan, the level of the water started to be critical
before 1700. Testimonies show that employees and
shopkeepers somehow had to make sense and manage
the dangerous situations by themselves (14, 30, 31, and
32). Two respondents located in Trans-en-Provence
started to take protective action soon after 1800, as the
water started to enter their shops. Both tried to pro-
tect some of their merchandise. Interviewee 33 was
with his parents who were the owners of the shop.
They carried on this task until the water was as high as
60 cm. They eventually escaped by driving back to
their home that was close by on a hill and luckily fol-
lowed a route that was free of flooding.
The number of imperiled people increased steadily
between 1630 and 1730. At that time 25% (7 persons)
of our sample can be counted as ‘‘imperiled.’’ Two of
them, immersed in their jobs (2b and 7) were literally
surprised and forced to escape as a survival reflex.
Four others (25, 29, 30, and 31) evacuated quite late
because of trying to secure goods or worrying less about
their own safety than material losses. Another did not feel
the danger coming (34) as she felt protected in her car.
During that period, as illustrated by the stories described
before, self-organization and emerging interpersonal in-
teractions were quite common. Most of our respondents
managed to get out of trouble by interacting with other
people, some of whomwere strangers but who happened
to be at the right place and time to help out. Sometimes
interpersonal interactions only helped the realization of
the danger and emergency of the situation; sometimes
physical help was needed.
Finally phase four, starting at 1815, is characterized by
the slow rising pace of recovery progressively replacing
protective actions. It also includes the last two pre-
cipitation sequences maintaining the peak flow of the
Nartuby in Trans-en-Provence until 2300. During this
phase, the water level was still rising in some areas, while
the Tuili"ere was going back to its riverbed in Figani"eres.
The ratio of people in protection peaks at 1815 at the same
time as the third rainfall peak, when the number of inter-
viewed people performing usual activities is under 10%.
Later the protection curve displays smaller peaks that also
correspond very well with peaks in rainfall intensities,
possibly illustrating enhanced awareness. Then, when the
protection rate decreases, the recovery curve starts to
rise quite steadily around 1845 to finally stabilize at
2300. The recovery process mainly happens in Figani"eres,
which is coherent with the REXhydro data, relating the
fast onset and drop in of the Tuili"ere River. During that
phase, at 2000 and 2100, two more people became en-
dangered while traveling.
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a methodology of postflood field
investigation exploring the link between crisis behavioral
response and hydrometeorological dynamics in space and
time. It aims at contextualizing a limited set of coping
responses observed with respect to local hydrometeoro-
logical conditions. The analysis of the collected data as-
sociates abductive and activity-based approaches. The
first one allows the identification of the possible contex-
tual factors influencing individual responses to flash flood.
The second one offers a framework for a comparative
analysis of the pace of the sequence and type of actions
using the flood dynamic as a common reference.
The proposed methodology is useful to compare the
pace and timeliness of the social responses across several
5Testimonies indicate that the level of water in the main street
rose 1.10m in 15min.
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flood events’ dynamics and social contexts. Some first
attempts of such comparisons were already made across
European countries (Creutin et al. 2009; Parker et al.
2009). However, they highlighted the problem of the
heterogeneity of the methods used for collecting data.
The proposed methodology contributes to addressing
this need of standardized and adequate social and
physical data collection, not available in existing disaster
databases. The use of a chronological guideline for the
interviews may appear as a constraint, inducing a loss
of richness in the narratives. However, it offers the op-
portunity to handle these narratives with the activity-
based approach and to initiate a quantitative analysis of
the timeliness and pace of the sequence of activities with
respect to local flood dynamics.
Nevertheless, such methodology still faces some chal-
lenges. One of them is related to the timing of the field
campaign and survey data collection in order to limit the
bias associated with the recollection process. In fact, it is
well known that human perception and memory vary
across individuals and with the length of time between the
perceptual experience and the moment when the survey
takes place. Therefore, the most appropriate moment for
collecting the data still remains to be defined based on
psycho-cognitive considerations. Another challenge that
still needs further considerations is related to the proposed
categorization of activities. The definition of the categories
is inspired by the literature (Drabek 1986; Lindell and
Perry 1992, 2004; Mileti 1995; Creutin et al. 2009; Parker
et al. 2009). But the process of categorization is based on
the researcher’s interpretation of the narratives and has to
be improved with a more detailed characterization of the
criteria used to associate the fragments of the narrative to
one specific activity. This work is currently under progress.
Eventually, the application of the proposed methodol-
ogy on the Var event (15 June 2010) allowed us to identify
some possible causes of the individual responses. The
difficulty in switching from daily activities to warning re-
sponses is one of the reasons and can be explained by the
possible conflicts of priorities between routine and ex-
ceptional circumstances. The difficulty in making sense
of environmental cues in the case of insufficient official
warning also appears as a possible cause of delay in the
individual response to flash flooding. The study also
reveals a form of the individual’s self-organization and
the emergence of small group responses that may in-
volve different types of social ties depending on the type
of area they take place. Finally, the Var data confirms
the role of contextual factors, as defined by Parker et al.
(2009): the timing of the hydrometeorological event, its
severity, and the experience of the flood seem to be es-
sential in the ability of individuals to make sense of the
situation and to adapt their activities.
The activity-based approach enables us to divide the
sociohydrometeorological event into four phases. The
first phase starts with intense rain and mixes routine ac-
tivities and the search for information. The second phase
comes with intense surface runoffs, encouraging in-
dividuals to organize themselves and sometimes to en-
gage in protective actions. The first imperiled people
appear also during this phase. The third phase comes with
the flood danger outburst and is accompanied with the
drop of routine or even information or organization ac-
tivities to the profit of protective actions. The first rescues
occur in this phase. Finally, the fourth phase is charac-
terized by a maintained peak flow and a still high level of
protective action, with sometimes recovery activities,
depending of the flood dynamics. Even though flooding
dynamics were quite different according to the catchment
size, dangerous situations and lack of anticipation hap-
pened both in Figani"eres’ very small catchment, leaving
only minutes for reaction, and in the larger catchments of
the Nartuby River that reacted relatively slower but still
rapidly enough to qualify as a flash flood.
The use of the methodology in other case studies
will help in complementing the categorization of the
individual pace of reaction. Based on this categori-
zation, it is possible to consider the integration of the
individual’s coping pace and hydrological responses
into a model of flood event dynamics that helps to un-
derstand the role played by the social and hydrological
parameters and, eventually, to forecast the possible
human impacts of flash floods.
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